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注册制改革的溢出效应 ——基于机构投资者羊群行为视角
李沁洋,刘洁萍
(西南大学经济管理学院,重庆 400715)
摘要:
摘要:在注册制改革以信息披露为核心的制度背景下,选取2013-2022年沪深A股非注册制发行上市的公司作为研究样本,构建多期双重差分模型,研究注册制改革产生的溢出效应。实证研究发现,注册制改革严格全面的信息披露能够显著降低同行非注册制上市公司机构投资者的羊群行为,且随着行业注册上市事件的增多而有所提高。机制分析表明,上述溢出效应由同行公司自愿性信息披露的提高、同行公司分析师关注度的提高两个路径产生作用。进一步研究发现,注册上市公司招股说明书可读性越强、前瞻性越高,对同行公司机构投资者的羊群行为产生更显著的抑制作用。通过对公司异质性分析发现,当同行公司的竞争环境越激烈、信息环境越差,注册制改革产生的溢出效应越显著。在注册制改革背景下,应完善信息披露制度要求,加大信息监管和违规惩罚力度;加强分析师信息中介地位,提高分析师专业能力;公司应改善自身的信息环境,提高信息透明度。
关键词:  关键词:注册制;溢出效应;机构投资者;羊群行为
DOI:
分类号:F832.5
基金项目:
Study on the Spillover Effects of Registration-Based System Reform——From the Perspective of Institutional Investors' Herding Behavior
LI Qin-yang,LIU Jie-ping
(School of Economics and Management,Southwest University)
Abstract:
Abstract:Under the institutional framework of the registration-based system reform,which emphasizes information disclosure as its core,this study selects Chinese A-share non-registration-based listed companies from 2013 to 2022 as the research sample.A multi-period difference-in-differences (DID) model is constructed to investigate the spillover effects of the registration-based system reform.Empirical results reveal that the stringent and comprehensive information disclosure requirements under the reform significantly reduce herding behavior among institutional investors in peer non-registration-based listed companies,with the effect strengthening as the number of registration-based IPOs within the industry increases.Mechanism analysis demonstrates that these spillover effects operate through two channels:(1) enhanced voluntary information disclosure by peer companies,and (2) increased analyst coverage for peer companies.Further research finds that higher readability and more forward-looking content in the prospectuses of registration-based listed companies exert a more pronounced inhibitory effect on herding behavior among institutional investors in peer companies.Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the spillover effects are more significant for peer companies operating in highly competitive industries or with poorer information environments.This study proposes the following recommendations:(1) Refine information disclosure regulations and strengthen regulatory enforcement and penalties for violations;(2) Enhance the role of analysts as information intermediaries and improve their professional capabilities;(3) Companies should optimize their information environments and increase information transparency to mitigate adverse market behaviors.
Key words:  Key words:Registration System;Institutional Investors;Herding Behavior;Spillover Effects
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