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演化博弈视角下的绿色金融发展动力研究
陈国庆 龙云安1,2
1.中国在“十三五规划”中首次将“绿色”作为五大发展理念之一,中国绿色发展的一系列顶层设计和实践都在“十三五”期间获得迅速推进。近年来,中国绿色金融体系建设不断完善,绿色金融产品不断创新,绿色金融发展取得丰硕的成果。本文研究了政府、企业和银行三大利益主体的行为对绿色金融发展的影响。通过构建演化博弈模型,讨论政府是否实行补贴和惩罚对绿色金融发展演化稳定策略的影响,并通过MATLAB软件对博弈系统进行动态仿真。研究结果表明:在无政府干预的情况下,银行和企业初始决策选择的比例决定了演化博弈系统是否会收敛到理想状态,研究发现银行和企业在节能减排的过程具有良性互动效应;2.在政府干预的情况下,博弈系统的演化结果都倾向于理想状态,且演化速度也明显提高。最后,针对绿色金融发展的实际情况提出了相应的对策建议,以期为绿色金融的可持续发展提供参考。
摘要:
中国在“十三五规划”中首次将“绿色”作为五大发展理念之一,中国绿色发展的一系列顶层设计和实践都在“十三五”期间获得迅速推进。近年来,中国绿色金融体系建设不断完善,绿色金融产品不断创新,绿色金融发展取得丰硕的成果。本文研究了政府、企业和银行三大利益主体的行为对绿色金融发展的影响。通过构建演化博弈模型,讨论政府是否实行补贴和惩罚对绿色金融发展演化稳定策略的影响,并通过MATLAB软件对博弈系统进行动态仿真。研究结果表明:在无政府干预的情况下,银行和企业初始决策选择的比例决定了演化博弈系统是否会收敛到理想状态,研究发现银行和企业在节能减排的过程具有良性互动效应;在政府干预的情况下,博弈系统的演化结果都倾向于理想状态,且演化速度也明显提高。最后,针对绿色金融发展的实际情况提出了相应的对策建议,以期为绿色金融的可持续发展提供参考。
关键词:  绿色金融;演化博弈;企业;银行;政府
DOI:
分类号:F832
基金项目:国家社科基金一般项目“川、渝自贸区与长江上游地区协同发展及路径研究”(项目编号:19BGL266),四川省软科学研究计划项目“全国碳市场建设背景下企业对碳市场响应行为能力研究——以四川省百家企业为例”(2019JDR0084),四川省哲学社会科学重点研究基地区域公共管理信息化研究中心项目“共享经济下四川产业融合发展创新路径及差异化策略研究”(项目编号:QGXH19-09);成都市哲学社会科学重点研究基地健康城市发展研究中心项目(项目编号:2019ZC003)
Research on the Development Impetus of Green Finance from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game
CHEN Guoqing LONG Yunan1,2
1.In the 13th five year plan,China has taken "green" as one of the five development concepts for the first time,and a series of top-level design and practice of China's green development have been rapidly promoted during the 13th five year plan. In recent years,China's green financial system has been continuously improved,green financial products have been continuously innovated,and green financial development has achieved fruitful results. This paper studies the impact of the behavior of the three major stakeholders, i.e. government,enterprises and banks,on the development of green finance.By constructing the evolutionary game model,this paper discusses the influence of government subsidies and penalties on the evolution and stability strategy of green finance,and makes a dynamic simulation of the game system through MATLAB software.The results show that:in the case of no government intervention,the proportion of the initial decision-making choice of banks and enterprises determines whether the evolutionary game system will converge to the ideal state.It is found that banks and enterprises have a positive interaction effect in the process of energy conservation and emission reduction;2.in the case of government intervention, the evolutionary results of the game system tend to the ideal state,and the evolutionary speed is also significantly improved. Finally, according to the actual situation of the development of green finance, the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward in order to provide reference for the sustainable development of green finance.
Abstract:
In the 13th five year plan,China has taken "green" as one of the five development concepts for the first time,and a series of top-level design and practice of China's green development have been rapidly promoted during the 13th five year plan. In recent years,China's green financial system has been continuously improved,green financial products have been continuously innovated,and green financial development has achieved fruitful results. This paper studies the impact of the behavior of the three major stakeholders, i.e. government,enterprises and banks,on the development of green finance.By constructing the evolutionary game model,this paper discusses the influence of government subsidies and penalties on the evolution and stability strategy of green finance,and makes a dynamic simulation of the game system through MATLAB software.The results show that:in the case of no government intervention,the proportion of the initial decision-making choice of banks and enterprises determines whether the evolutionary game system will converge to the ideal state.It is found that banks and enterprises have a positive interaction effect in the process of energy conservation and emission reduction;in the case of government intervention, the evolutionary results of the game system tend to the ideal state,and the evolutionary speed is also significantly improved. Finally, according to the actual situation of the development of green finance, the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward in order to provide reference for the sustainable development of green finance.
Key words:  Green Finance;Evolutionary Game;Enterprise;Bank;Government
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