| 摘要: |
| 本文主要探讨了我国民营上市公司终极控制人的两权分离程度与银行借款和公开
发债选择之间的关系，以2011-2015年我国民营上市公司的面板数据为样本，利用多元回归分
析方法进行研究。结果表明两权分离程度越大，公司进行债务融资时越倾向于银行借款；当信
息不对称程度越低、信息透明程度越高时，公司倾向于选择公开发债，两权分离程度较大导致
的代理问题也会得到弱化。结论符合有效市场理论。 |
| 关键词: 两权分离；债务融资 ；银行借款 ；公开债券 |
| DOI： |
| 分类号:F830.2 |
| 基金项目: |
|
| The Control-Ownership Wedge, InformationAsymmetry and Debt Financing——Based on the Sample Analysis of Chinese Private Listed Companies |
|
Sun Bei，Peng Jue
|
|
College of Economics & Management, Southwest University
|
| Abstract: |
| This paper mainly discusses the control-ownership wedge of private listed companies in China and
the choice between bank debt and public debt. The article takes China's private listed companies panel data as sample
and uses multiple regression analysis. The study found that the greater the degree of the control-ownership wedge,
corporate debt financing more inclined to bank loans; when the information asymmetry is lower and the information
transparency is higher, companies tend to choose public bonds, the agency problems caused by a larger degree of the
control-ownership wedge will be weakened. The conclusion is consistent with the efficient market theory. |
| Key words: The Control-ownership Wedge； Debt Financing；Bank Debt； Public Debt |
